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The articles and comments that appear in this issue were pre-
pared for the symposium at the Yale Law School on the nature and
purposes of legal scholarship, a topic whose breadth is reflected both
in the diversity of subjects that the authors of the principal articles
have chosen to discuss, and in the different points of view-perhaps
more accurately, the different moods-that they express. For my part,
I wish to address an aspect of legal scholarship that is not emphasized
in the symposium articles themselves, but that affects the context in
which they must be read. I have in mind the role legal scholarship
plays in the process of moral education that forms an indispensable
part of the training law students receive. The concept of moral edu-
cation is somewhat vague, and I will attempt to clarify what I mean
by it and to indicate my reasons for thinking that it is so important
a part of the instructional program in which the law teacher is en-
gaged. I want to begin, however, with a more mundane observation,
an observation that each of the symposium participants makes in one
way or another, and that provides the point of departure for any
serious reflection on the special qualities of legal scholarship. It is
an obvious fact that the legal scholar makes his living as a law teacher,
and in his teaching he must, of necessity, take account of the profes-
sional nature of his school's educational program. The legal scholar
works and teaches in a professional school. What does this mean?
It means, first of all, that the law teacher has, for whatever reasons,
chosen a life that is different in important respects from the profes-
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sional lives that most of his students will lead after they graduate.
Law teachers live in the university, some more and some less, and
this represents a special way of life, both in its mundane detail-aca-
demic lawyers keep different hours, work under different pressures,
and receive different rewards than do their counterparts in practice
-and also in the values for which it ultimately stands. Of course, law
teachers are not the only ones that have chosen a life in the university:
professors of history, philosophy, economics, and literature have all
chosen the same life. To the extent that they, like law teachers, are
engaged in the education of graduate students, however, professors
in the humanities and social sciences are, by and large, training others
for lives of the kind they themselves lead. Even though job prospects
are dim and some students may eventually have to follow paths that
they regard as second-best, such as going to law school, there is in
the humanities and social sciences an implicit consensus between teach-
er and graduate student regarding the best kind of life.
In my experience, the teacher of undergraduates likewise does not
confront the explicit disparity in choice of lifeplan or lifestyle that
separates the academic lawyer from his students, though for a dif-
ferent reason: many undergraduates have not yet chosen the career
and kind of life they want to lead, and to the extent they have, we
regard this as bad, as a sign of premature professionalism. To be
sure, one who teaches undergraduates must know that most of his
students will eventually choose nonuniversity careers; it is nonthe-
less true that he does not face a classroom of students that have al-
ready expressed a preference for a life outside the university and
that feel committed to their decision. This is not true of the law teach-
er. When he looks at the students in his class, he sees men and women
that by and large have already made up their minds about what they
want to be and are in the process of adjusting their expectations and
even their desires to that decision.
The activity of law teaching thus has a built-in tension not present
in many other university disciplines. The fact that he teaches pro-
fessional school students who have chosen a way of life very different
from his own continuously reminds the law school teacher of the
choice that he has made and stimulates him to reflect on the mean-
ing of a career devoted to the academic study of law and the nature
of the contribution that he can make to those whose lives will not
be centered in a university. The disparity between his way of life
and his students' encourages the law teacher to think about those ques-
tions-questions that are likely to occur less often and to seem less
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urgent to a professor of philosophy because he does not experience
a similar tension in his teaching, having as students only those who
have chosen a life identical to his own or who have not yet made
any choice at all.
I have said that the life of a law teacher differs from that of his
students insofar as it is centered in a university. What, more precise-
ly, are the special qualities of the academic lawyer's university life?
First, it is a life dominated by two activities that play little or no
role in the life of the practicing lawyer: teaching and scholarship. A
practicing attorney may, of course, do either or both of these things,
but they are not his central concerns. By contrast, teaching and
scholarship are the principal activities of the academic lawyer, the
activities that reflect his primary professional interests and capabili-
ties, and the institution in which he lives his professional life is de-
liberately organized to promote these activities. Teaching and schol-
arship are the raisons d'etre of the university.
There is a second and even more important point worth making
about the situation of an academic lawyer. The tension endemic to
law teaching, which I have described in very general terms as a ten-
sion between a life in the university and a life outside it, is reflected
as well in what I believe is a characteristic tension between the two
activities, teaching and scholarship, that constitute the work of the
academic lawyer. The aim of someone teaching law is to prepare his
students to become lawyers. Naturally, a teacher of law introduces
academic material into his classroom instruction and presents the
subject he is teaching from a point of view shaped by his scholarly
concerns; he emphasizes features of the law, such as its structural or-
ganization, philosophical presuppositions, or historical development,
that he finds especially interesting. Nevertheless, in teaching, the aca-
demic lawyer serves his students: his teaching is determined in the
most basic way by his students' need to learn the law in preparation for
a nonuniversity career. By contrast, in his scholarly work, the academic
lawyer serves himself: he takes the satisfaction of his own intellectual
interests in the law as his paramount goal. In this branch of his work,
it is his own interests as a member of a university community, not
the interests of his students as practicing-lawyers-to-be, that determine
how and why he does what he does.
Doubtless, the contrast I have drawn between law teaching and
legal scholarship will seem to some too stark. These two activities are
different, of course, but should not each be viewed as a complement
to the other, enriching it by providing a continual source of fresh in-
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sight and intellectual support? There is considerable truth in this
view. To take an important, if somewhat banal, example, a law
teacher whose research has clarified for him the basic arrangement of
the subject he is teaching-an arrangement, let us suppose, that is not
immediately reflected in its doctrinal content-is likely, just for that
reason, to be a more successful pedagogue, to be able to present the
subject to his students more clearly than he otherwise could have
done. This view of scholarship and teaching as mutually supportive
is appealing because it makes the relationship between law teachers
and law students seem, despite the different lives they have chosen,
less a tension-filled opposition than a fruitful collaboration based on
a cooperative division of labor. Yet, though this view is appealing and
true in important respects, it masks a deep-seated tension between
the activities of law teaching and legal scholarship. I say "deep-seated"
because the tension in question results from these two activities hav-
ing different, indeed antithetical, aims or purposes; the tension there-
fore cannot be eliminated without altering one or the other in some
fundamental respect.
What is the nature of this conflict between law teaching and legal
scholarship, and how does it arise? I believe that the conflict has less
to do with the peculiar character of legal scholarship, which has the
same fundamental aim as any other scholarly endeavor, than with
the special qualities of law teaching-qualities that, viewed in a cer-
tain light, are indeed antithetical to the defining aim of scholarship.
In both theory and practice, law teaching has two components. The
law teacher is expected, first of all, to convey to his students an un-
derstanding of some substantive body of law, a familiarity with the
basic rules and principles of, say, contract law or civil procedure
or bankruptcy. He is also expected-most obviously in the first year,
but in upper level classes as well-to assist his students in developing
the skills of argument and analysis that they will require as lawyers.
It is this second goal that the method of classroom instruction, as dis-
tinct from the content of the material being taught, is meant to serve.
The repertoire of analytic techniques that a law teacher legitimately
may feel a duty to present to his students is broader than it was be-
fore the curricular revolution initiated by the legal realists a little
more than fifty years ago. Many different forms of analysis that once
were irrelevant to the practice of law are now of considerable im-
portance in certain fields. A law school may, therefore, justifiably
include them in its instructional program. Today, for example, a
familiarity with psychoanalytic theory is very important, even if it is
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not yet indispensable, for anyone preparing for a career in family
law; thus, the introduction of some psychoanalytic material into a
course on family law is entirely justified on the ground that it is
likely to aid students in meeting their professional responsibilities as
counsellors and advocates. The new techniques of analysis-psycho-
analytic theory is one, economic theory is clearly another-that are
now being taught in law-school classrooms come primarily from pure-
ly academic disciplines, and their growing importance might seem to
confirm the view that law teaching and legal scholarship have a close
and supportive relationship with one another.
Despite their increased importance, however, these new techniques
do not constitute the core of the law school's educational program
insofar as it aims to develop the skills needed to practice law well.
Today, as sixty years ago, the most important skill the law teacher
imparts is the skill of advocacy, the ability to construct and defend
a convincing legal argument. Before the law student can find any
other analytic techniques professionally useful, he must have mas-
tered the ability to make a legal argument-he must know how to
build an argument from legal materials, such as cases, statutes, admin-
istrative orders, and the provisions of the Constitution, in accordance
with the established, if not always precise, rules that determine how
these materials are to be used, such as the rule of stare decisis coupled
with the techniques for construing a judicial opinion in either an
expansive or a restrictive way. The other techniques taught in law
school can supplement this most basic skill, but despite the enormous
curricular changes of the last sixty years, the skill of advocacy remains
the cornerstone of all law-school instruction.
To get a dearer understanding of the conflict between law teaching
and legal scholarship, it is necessary to look more closely at the na-
ture of advocacy itself. We may get some help in this regard from one
of Plato's dialogues, the Gorgias,1 a dialogue of special interest to law-
yers. In that dialogue, Socrates confronts a famous Sicilian rhetorician
named Gorgias, and with the help of several others, the two of them
discuss the nature of rhetoric, or oratory, and the proposition that
it is an art-indeed, in Gorgias's view, the highest and best art. At one
point in the dialogue, Gorgias describes his craft as one that confers
on its practitioner "freedom for man himself, and at the same time
... rule over others in his own city."2 When Socrates asks him what
he means, Gorgias replies:
I. PLATo, Goams (T. Irwin trans. 1979).
2. Id. at 19 (line 452d).
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I say it is the power to persuade ay speech jurymen in the jury-
court, council-men in the Council Chamber, assembly-men in the
Assembly, and in every other gathering, whatever political gath-
ering there may be.3
This ability, as Socrates himself puts it, is the ability to produce con-
viction, the belief that one is right.
Socrates goes on to observe that there must be a difference between
conviction and knowledge: one can be convinced of something, but
only mistakenly, and in this sense lack knowledge of it. It is possible,
according to Socrates, to have a belief or conviction about something
without knowing it; the familiar phenomenon of mistaken beliefs and
the fact that we routinely distinguish true from false beliefs both
testify to this difference. The great strength of Socrates's distinction
between knowledge and belief is attributable to the fact that the dis-
tinction itself is not undermined by our inability to explain coher-
ently and precisely what gives knowledge its distinctive character,
what makes it something more than mere conviction or belief. Even
if we cannot provide such an explanation, it seems impossible to do
without the distinction Socrates draws, for unless we assume such
a distinction between knowledge and belief, we cannot account for
the fact that we assign truth values to our beliefs, that we regard
some beliefs as true and others as false, and in this sense evaluate
them from a standpoint different from that of belief itself.
Having distinguished knowledge from conviction, Socrates says that
the orator, the man who makes his living persuading juries and leg-
islative assemblies, is concerned with the second. According to Soc-
rates, if rhetoric, or oratory, can be viewed as any kind of art at all,
it is the art of producing conviction in one's listeners. In saying this,
Socrates is attempting to describe what he understands to be the de-
fining aim or purpose of the activity in which the rhetorician is en-
gaged. The rhetorician seeks to persuade his listeners. If, after hearing
him, his listeners have acquired the beliefs he wants them to acquire
(that so-and-so is innocent or that a proposed law is unwise), the ora-
tor has succeeded; if they have acquired or retained convictions other
than those he wishes to produce, the orator has failed.
Socrates maintains that the orator is indifferent to the truth or falsi-
ty of the beliefs he seeks to inculcate; he does not care whether they
represent knowledge or mere conviction. This is a strong assertion
and one that is easily misunderstood. It is important to observe, first
3. Id. (line 452e).
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of all, that the orator's indifference to truth as Socrates conceives it
is entirely consistent with his taking a strong interest in persuading
his listeners of the truth of the beliefs he wants them to accept.
Indeed, the orator must take such an interest: unless his listeners
regard the beliefs in question as true beliefs, they will not be con-
vinced, for no one knowingly embraces a false belief. Nevertheless,
the orator's concern with the truth of beliefs is only secondary; he
cares about truth only insofar as it bears upon his fundamental con-
cern with the production of belief or conviction in those to whom he
addresses his appeal. Put differently, the orator, when exercising the
craft of rhetoric, is not concerned with truth and falsity for their
own sake, but takes them into account only to the extent that they
bear in an instrumental or strategic way on the production of con-
viction, which, as the point of the orator's activity, gives that pur-
suit its purpose and direction. Advocacy is distinctive, not because it
is wholly unconcerned with truth, but because it is concerned with
truth only as an aid to persuasion; in advocacy, the desire to persuade
determines what role truth-seeking is to play, not the other way around.
It is also important to note that the orator's indifference to truth
is consistent with a strong interest in persuading himself of the truth
of the beliefs he wants others to accept. For powerful psychological
reasons, the orator's need to persuade his listeners that these beliefs
are true often makes it important that he persuade himself of the same
thing. An orator that does not believe in the truth of what he wishes
others to accept is likely to be a poorer advocate than he would be
if he could assert the truth of the beliefs in question without any
feeling of disingenuousness or deceit. For this reason, the orator's
own conviction is often essential to the effective practice of his craft.
Yet, even in this respect, the orator's concern for truth is subordinate
to his main objective. Although the knowledgeable orator is likely to
be the most convincing one, it is nonetheless true that the goal of his
activity is not the transfer of knowledge but the production of con-
viction. Even if the latter cannot be accomplished without the former,
success in the practice of oratory is measured by the latter alone. The
ability to convince is the yardstick by which the orator's work is
measured, and it defines the limited and subsidiary place that a con-
cern for truth may properly have in his efforts to persuade.
Socrates's account of the craft of oratory captures the most impor-
tant feature of what I have called the skill of advocacy, the skill that
is central to law-school teaching. Advocacy is, in essence, the construc-
tion of a convincing or persuasive argument. A persuasive argument in
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law, however, is significantly different from a persuasive argument in
other disciplines. Consider an argument in geometry. A formal proof
of some Euclidean proposition, for example, is of course intended to
persuade those for whose benefit it has been constructed, say, the
readers of geometry textbooks. Nevertheless, the argument's power to
persuade is a virtue only because the argument is logically sound, or
to put it more simply, because it is true. In this sense, arguments in
geometry subordinate persuasiveness to truth: a persuasive argument
is a good thing if and only if it is true and makes the truth more
perspicuous. -This relationship is precisely the reverse of what one
finds in rhetorical arguments, which, as I have emphasized, make a
concern for truth subordinate to the overriding aim of persuasion.
One might object that a comparison of the sort I have drawn be-
tween legal advocacy and geometry is inapt because the latter dis-
cipline has one essential feature that the former lacks: an unequivo-
cal standard by which to judge the truth and falsity of whatever
arguments one constructs. Because nothing of this kind exists in the
law, one might reasonably think that a concern for truth of the sort
that characterizes all geometrical arguments is out of place in any
reflective activity that takes the law as its subject. But that view, I
think, is mistaken.
To see why this view is wrong, consider literary criticism, which,
in at least one respect, more closely resembles legal argument. When
a critic writes about a novel or poem there is no simple standard for
determining whether his interpretation is correct in an indisputably
final sense. At most, his argument can have more or less plausibility,
can be supported or undermined by the views of other critics, can
dominate work in the field for a time or be consigned to oblivion.
In this respect, the work of a literary critic resembles the work of an
advocate constructing legal arguments, arguments that can also be
thoughtful and imaginative, but never true in the same sense that
a sound geometrical proof is true. Despite this similarity, however,
there is a profound difference between what a literary critic does when
he explicates a text and what an advocate does when he represents
a client or a cause. A literary critic attempts to say something true
about his subject, and the lack of any clear yardstick for determining
whether he has been successful in this regard does not alter the char-
acter of his attempt in the least. One can express this same point by
saying that a critic is oriented towards the truth in that he takes its
discovery and presentation as his guiding task. The arguments a critic
constructs to defend his views are of course meant to persuade, but
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like the arguments of a geometer, the value of their persuasive force
depends entirely on their being vehicles for making manifest some-
thing true about a work of literature. In literary analysis, as in ge-
ometry, persuasiveness is a value of secondary importance, subordinate
to the primary end of producing knowledge. Despite the striking dif-
ferences between them, these two disciplines share that feature, which
sets both of them apart from legal advocacy understood as the prac-
tice of rhetoric in Socrates's sense.
From the advocate's point of view, the value of an argument in a
lawsuit or before a legislative committee depends entirely on its
ability to persuade, on whether it leads to victory or defeat, where
these mean convincing or failing to convince the judge or committee,
not conveying or failing to convey the truth. To make a persuasive
argument in law, one must have mastered many skills: the delicate
use of precedent, the exegesis of statutes, the understanding and ma-
nipulation of judicial psychology, and so on. It is no small matter to
be able to make a persuasive legal argument; many law students find
this the most difficult thing they have to learn, and the one for which
their previous training provides the least guidance. Still, the defining
goal of legal advocacy is, in Socrates's words, the production of con-
viction rather than knowledge. This is the target at which the ad-
vocate aims in doing what he does. Of course, the practicing advo-
cate may be confident that the truth will be revealed-or at least that
it is most likely to be revealed-through a process in which compet-
ing advocates pit their skills of persuasion against one another, on
behalf of clients in a courtroom or interests in a legislature. Never-
theless, it is not the advocate's goal, as an advocate, to bring the truth
to light. If the truth is revealed, it is because activities of many ad-
vocates, each aiming at something fundamentally different, have been
coordinated, like those of Adam Smith's baker and butcher, in such
a way as to bring this result about by a kind of invisible-hand mech-
anism. Although the advocate may contribute to the discovery of the
truth by participating in a process of this sort, he does not take its
discovery as his own deliberate task. If his work brings the truth to
light at all, it does so incidentally and not purposefully. Once again,
we are brought back to the Socratic view: in doing what he does, the
advocate is indifferent to truth.
In the Gorgias, Socrates is especially interested in what effect the
art of oratory is likely to have on the soul, or character, of its prac-
titioner. I want to ask a similar question: What effect does a training
in advocacy, whose defining characteristic is an indifference to truth,
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have on the character of law students? This question is likely to
seem extraordinarily presumptuous. What right does a law teacher
have even to raise such a question about his students? The character
his students have, or acquire, is their business-their most personal
business; by what right may a law teacher make it his concern as
well? Law students, it can be argued, come to law school to learn a
craft; what they do with it, how they use the tools their teachers give
them, what kinds of lives they fashion for themselves-in short, the
conditions of their souls-are matters entirely for them to worry about.
In this view, the law teacher should regard himself as simply supply-
ing the tools of a trade. This view is in fact very close to the one
that Gorgias adopts in his conversation with Socrates.
But however inappropriate it may seem, law teachers do, I believe,
have a special responsibility to raise the question I put a moment ago
and to consider the effect that an indifference to truth is likely to
have on a person's character. They have this responsibility, in my
judgment, because the craft they teach not only tolerates an indif-
ference to truth, but actively encourages it by making its ultimate
goal something altogether different from truth-seeking-in sharp con-
trast to most other disciplines taught in universities, which aim at the
truth whether or not they actually attain it. Moreover, this question
of character is of concern not only to law teachers, but also to law
students, who ask themselves this question with great intensity and
seriousness, especially at the beginning of their legal education. Many
law students worry that as they become skilled advocates, they will
lose their concern for what is true and right, and become preoccupied
instead with what convinces or persuades. However much this appre-
hension reflects the normal anxieties associated with the choice of a
career and the commitment it entails, it also bears witness to a deep
and legitimate concern on the part of law students, a concern that
their teachers have a responsibility to address.
The indifference to truth that all advocacy entails is likely, it seems
to me, to affect the character of one who practices the craft for a
long time and in a studied way. Because it requires its practitioner
to think of truth as, at most, an instrumental good, not as something
valued for its own sake, advocacy encourages what can only be de-
scribed as a kind of cynicism regarding efforts to discover and to state
the truth about the wide range of human matters with which the
law is concerned. I believe that the process of becoming an advo-
cate is likely to make someone more cynical about truth-seeking: not,
of course, about all forms of truth-seeking, since there is no reason
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to think that a training in advocacy changes anyone's beliefs about,
say, the efforts of physicists and astronomers to understand the struc-
ture of the physical world; but more cynical about attempts to dis-
cover the truth concerning the manifold forms of human conduct
that the law, in one way or another, purports to regulate. By "cyni-
cism" I mean an attitude that questions the worth of such attempts
to discover the truth and is inclined to see them as pointless exercises
that cannot be justified by any genuine or respectable human need.
The cynicism of the advocate is not the product of his having at-
tempted to discover the truth about human affairs and failed; rather,
it is the product of his having become accustomed to disregard the
question of truthfulness as irrelevant to the practice of his craft. It is
easy to believe that efforts to state the truth about man's moral and
social life are illusory and vain; the professional attitude of the ad-
vocate, as it hardens into a habit, tends to confirm this belief and
to augment its power.
To put the same point a slightly different way, when one prac-
tices advocacy in a self-conscious manner for a long time, the experi-
ence, like any extended experience of this sort, is likely to affect
what one cares about. Our cares reflect our habits-the reverse is, of
course, true to some extent as well-and the habitual indifference to
truth that the advocate must cultivate in his professional life is likely
to promote what is perhaps best understood, in a literal sense, as a
kind of carelessness about the truth. Because one's character depends
to a large degree on what one cares about, an education in advocacy
tends to produce a character of a certain type. For any particular law
student, of course, education in advocacy is only one influence among
many on the formation of his cares and character, but it is an influ-
ence that seems to me to have a steady effect in the direction I have
described.
Supposing I am right, why should anyone care whether the process
of training advocates has the effect I have ascribed to it? In my view,
law teachers not only have a reason to care whether advocacy affects
a person's character in the way I have suggested; they have a respon-
sibility-a moral responsibility-to do what they can to prevent the
indifference to truth that advocacy entails from hardening into a cyn-
ical carelessness about efforts to discover the truth concerning the
various aspects of human social life that the law encompasses. It was
this responsibility that I had in mind at the outset when I referred
to the moral education that forms a part of a law student's training.
The view that a law teacher has such a responsibility is contro-
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versial: if one believes that truth is an empty, perhaps even a per-
nicious, idea, there is nothing wrong with, and there may even be
something good about, a process that tends to make those who un-
dergo it cynical about the truth. From this point of view, the cyn-
icism of the advocate may appear to be a desirable prophylactic against
the dangers of a naive philosophical enthusiasm for the truth-in the
name of which, after all, many terrible things have been done. I
cannot defend adequately, in the space appropriate to a Foreword,
my own view that cynicism of this sort is something bad, that it is
harmful to the soul of the person involved, and that law teachers
have a moral duty to discourage its growth to the extent they can.
For now, I can say only this much: there is a profound difference
between skepticism about particular truth claims-a caution or re-
serve in accepting the asserted truth of particular propositions, espe-
cially those about human social life-and a cynical carelessness about
the effort to generate such propositions and to establish their validity.
A love of truth may in fact lead one, as it led Socrates, to reject every
account of what the truth is; but that is very different from simply
not caring about the truth. It is the latter that seems to me pro-
foundly destructive, especially if it concerns those things regarding
which the truth appears most elusive, namely, our own human social
arrangements and practices.
Cynicism of the sort I am describing is destructive because the
truth-whatever it is, and whether it is something ultimately attain-
able or merely a regulative ideal-represents the idea of a convergence
in our independent personal experiences of the world. The truth is
a common meeting ground. It is necessarily the same for all of us,
and the affirmation of its value is, in an important sense, an affir-
mation of the ideal of community. Shared beliefs, of course, can
also establish a community among men, but there is an important
difference between this kind of community and the kind that rests-
or would if we could attain it-on a shared understanding of the
truth. It is only contingently or accidentally the case that people
share the beliefs they happen to hold in common, and no community
based upon belief alone can last forever. The truth, by contrast, is
always the same for everyone; that is what truth, understood as an
ideal, means. Compared to the community that truth promises, how-
ever remote its attainment, the community of shared belief is fragile
and evanescent. If one values community-and much of human life
would be pointless if one did not-it is important to care about the
truth, for a commitment to truth is one of the things that most
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powerfully and effectively express the idea of our common humanity
and sustain us in our efforts to achieve it.
I am now in a position to say what I think is the relationship be-
tween legal scholarship and law teaching, or rather, what I think it
ought to be. To a significant degree, law teaching is a training in
advocacy; that is one of its central functions. Advocacy entails an
indifference to truth, which in turn encourages a cynical carelessness
about the truth, thus undermining the important good of communi-
ty. I have said that I think law teachers have a moral responsibility to
prevent this cynicism from taking root in the souls of their students.
One way in which a law teacher meets this responsibility is through
his scholarship, or, more precisely, through the way in which he brings
his scholarship into the instructional process carried on in the class-
room. I do not mean by this simply reporting what he has discovered
in his scholarly work, but something that is more appropriately de-
scribed as a type of comportment, a way of presenting oneself as a
bearer of distinct values.
I will return to the idea of comportment in a moment, but first
I should say exactly why I believe scholarship to be an antidote to
the cynical carelessness about truth that advocacy encourages. To be
sure, any scholarly achievement is partial, one-sided, transient, and
inevitably influenced in its inception and execution by the scholar's
habits, preferences, values, and so on; in sum, every work of scholar-
ship falls short of stating the complete and undistorted truth about
whatever aspect of the world it attempts to explain. In my judgment,
however, it is a more important fact that every scholarly endeavor,
no matter what its subject, aims to state something true regardless of
how far short of this goal it actually falls. Someone might object
that this is true of only one variety or branch of legal scholarship,
and that there are other forms as well-for example, those that seek
to provide reasoned support for a change in the law. Scholarship, one
might argue, includes more than pure scholarship. In my judgment,
that view is mistaken: all scholarship is, by its nature, pure scholar-
ship, and that is so even though it is also true that not everything
academic lawyers write is scholarship. The defining characteristic of
scholarship is its preoccupation with the discovery of truth. The end
of scholarship is the discovery of truth and the promotion of knowl-
edge. The same point is sometimes made by saying that the schol-
ar seeks knowledge for its own sake, not for some further purpose,
although the knowledge he acquires may be instrumentally useful
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for other ends. To understand the world as it truly is-this, and noth-
ing else, is the goal of scholarship.
The essential difference between scholarship and advocacy should
now be clear: whereas the latter is indifferent to truth in that it does
not regard the discovery of truth as something valuable for its own
sake, the former has the apprehension and expression of the truth
as its internal, constitutive goal. These two activities have different
aims and therefore entirely different meanings. The scholar cares
about truth-indeed that is what defines him as a scholar-and it is
his care for the truth that must somehow be set against the cynical
carelessness that a training in advocacy encourages. To do so is one
way-in my view, it is the most important and the only responsible
way-in which a law teacher can preserve in his students an attitude
of friendship, or goodwill, towards those who seek the truth and in-
deed towards the truth itself.
How exactly is this to be done? What is essential is that the scholar
bring into the classroom the spirit of his work, not its finished product;
that is why I said, a moment ago, that integrating scholarship into
the law school's instructional process means more than simply re-
porting the discoveries one has made. How the spirit of scholarship
is to be conveyed to one's students is an extremely difficult and per-
sonal question; there is no simple recipe for doing so. Every teacher
has to try, in his own way, to comport himself as a scholar. He must
find a way to make it clear that he cares for the truth-so much as
to have chosen a university life centered on its pursuit. To some ex-
tent, I suppose, the members of a low faculty make this clear simply
by having decided to become teachers, rather than practitioners, of
law. But the meaning of this choice cannot be altogether clear for
their students, most of whom have made a very different one. In my
view, law teachers have a responsibility to try to make the meaning
of their choice intelligible to their students during the relatively brief
period they spend in the university. They do this by revealing in their
teaching what they care about as academics, while at the same time
preparing their students for careers very different from their own. The
most important thing a teacher teaches his students is what he cares
about, and why. This is a responsibility incumbent on all teachers,
but it is one that law teachers, for the reasons I have tried to de-
scribe, may rightly claim to feel with special intensity.
In meeting his responsibility as a moral educator, the law teacher
also fulfills one of his obligations as a scholar, and in this way, perhaps,
he achieves a better understanding of his own vocation and its mean-
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ing. Before he can meet his responsibilities in this regard, however,
he must recognize the extent to which his own training as an advo-
cate, and his close professional association with institutions that en-
courage and reward the practice of advocacy, threaten his ability to
sustain the wholehearted commitment to truth for its own sake that
scholarship requires. This is the danger within, the danger that every
law teacher faces in himself and must confront before he can meet
his responsibilities to his students. This danger would be serious in
any case, but it is made more serious by the general intellectual cyn-
icism of the age in which we live, a cynicism that teaches the empti-
ness of the idea of truth and the pointlessness of efforts to attain it.
A symposium of this sort provides an occasion for law teachers every-
where to affirm their common commitment to the life of scholarship
and their willingness to protect it against the forces, in themselves
and in the world, that render it permanently vulnerable.
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